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This paper contributes to the recent stream of literature on NK Model’s applications to 
the field of technological evolution. It is argued that while the model has a great 
explanatory potential in economics proper, its behavioral foundations are still 
maladapted for treatment of purportive decision-making strategies for technological 
innovation. Concentrating on the decision rule for accepting novelties, we first analyze 
the consequences of intentional and unintentional imprecision in following hill-climbing 
strategy, highlighting the interplay between rigidity and deliberate experimentation. 
Building on Simon’s insights on satisficing behavior and designing without final goals we 
build a simulative model that provides a possibility to compare strategies differing in the 
desired level of imprecision. Secondly, we shift our attention to the question of 
organizational memory, analyzing in a simulation setting a fully memory dependent and 
a fully memory independent innovation-related strategies. The results confirm that from 
the one hand up to a certain level “imperfection” of rule-following behavior is a virtue 
rather than a threat, while from the other, that past successes can preclude adaptability 









Modeling evolution of boundedly rational agents in economics is a tricky issue in 
many respects. Grounding such attempts in theories originally designed for analyzing 
evolutionary processes in a completely different domain makes the issue even more 
complex. However, coping with the difficulties encountered can well be justified by the 
rewarding end results of such an endeavor. 
The recent and fast growing research on applying Stuart Kauffman’s NK Model 
(Kauffman & Levin 1987, Kauffman 1993) to a vast terrain of behavioral, organizational 
and strategic issues in economics (see Levinthal 1997, Frenken et al. 1999, Kauffman et. 
al. 2000, Gavetti & Levinthal 2000, Rivkin 2000, Fleming & Sorensen 2001 among 
many others) seem to provide a valid way to formalize in analytical, or more commonly, 
simulative models a number of phenomena that formerly have either been disregarded, or 
remained the prerogative of appreciative theorizing. 
Few of the most significant advantages the model provides us with when applied to 
studies of evolving technological and organizational forms in microeconomics can be 
seen as meta-theoretical and not confined to any field of science in particular. First and 
foremost this refers to its graph-theoretical structure and bases in non-integral space, 
presupposing the connections between the elements in the system under scrutiny to have 
as much explanatory power in the analysis of its dynamics as the characteristics of those 
elements themselves. When the system that we analyze is the technology employed by a 
firm, this would translate into a shift from the commonly used (and as commonly 
criticized) production function approach to that of production recipes, acquired ability to 
include in the analysis apart from the existing, the nascent technologies, and the evolution 
taking place on performance or technology landscape where the distance between two 
technologies determines the ease with which a shift from one to another can be made.
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2 All those notions and concepts will be defined and explained in detail below Nevertheless, the behavioral foundations of the model are clearly field-specific, and 
while fitting well in explaining the evolutionary process of change on microbiological 
level, they need to be seriously adjusted when we venture into an analysis of agents who 
are humans or that are man-made artifacts. Unlike genes, humans can think, define and 
follow different rules, act strategically, improvise, experiment, learn from their mistakes 
and successes, remember and forget, be biased, use insight, etc, etc…The list would have 
still been incomplete even if I went on for the rest of my life. 
Even more ambitious than “simply” listing all the determinants of behavior in 
which human or human-shaped evolution differs from evolution on genetic level, would 
be an attempt to actually incorporate all those in a single model. This is clearly not my 
intention here. 
Instead, I would mainly concentrate on the rule of accepting or rejecting novelty, 
first introduced to the field of technological change by Kauffman & Macready (1995), 
and used quite consistently ever since. My aim would be in trying to show the 
inconsistency of hill climbing scenario from a behavioral point of view in its being both 
myopic and perfect at the same time. The assumption of absolute myopia has been lifted 
in our parallel research (Hovhannisian 2003b) to give a room for analyzing breadth and 
depth of search, while this paper in sequence deals with a scenario of myopic local search 
with noise, or as we call it here, imperfect local search. 
Doing so opens up space to discuss some further behavioral issues like deliberate 
experimentation, satisficing, designing without final goals, organizational memory and 
organizational forgetting. The analysis is formalized in a simulation setting taking as a 
benchmark the original formulation of the model and showing the differences in 
dynamics the named modifications bring about. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the framework of research is 
defined, the definitions provided, and the original model discussed. After that we 
concentrate on the search rule used by the agents, and show both desirability and 
plausibility of introducing imperfections in the myopic local search. Special attention is 
given to the requirement of consistency in the treatment of bounds on rationality and 
satisficing behavior. Further on, satisficing behavior is discussed more in detail in connection to the issue of designing without final goals (Simon 1969). At this point the 
simulative model, based on the insights thus gained, is built and run in two major 
settings, differing in the treatment of organizational memory. After the analysis of results, 
conclusions are drawn, and further research agenda outlined. 
Defining the Framework of Analysis: 
1.1. Basics of Kauffman’s NK Model 
As the name suggests, two main components of the model are N and K, where the 
former represents the number of elements a system is comprised of, and thus defines how 
large it is, while the latter measures the number of other elements a change in a given 
element’s state affects, and thus defines the level of interdependences within it.   
An additional component of the system is A, which measures the number of 
different states each element can occupy. For simplicity, A is normally set to 2, so that we 
can represent the system as a binary string. For example the string {1110} would 
represent a system of 4 elements, 1 of which is in the state ‘0’, while the 3 others in the 
state ‘1’. If we think of some technology as a system, states of the elements can be seen 
either as an on/off setting of a knob on a machine, or else as a usage of one of the 
alternative technological processes or features. This is similar to the idea of 
morphological analysis of technological trajectories (Foray & Grübler 1991). In their 
example “four characteristic parameters [of molding technology] are identified and 
subdivided: 






















Translating this into our framework, the subscript after each P would denote the 
position of the given element in the string, and the superscript would denote its state (“0” 
or ”1”). In this particular example the elements can be combined in 2
4=16 different ways 
                                                 
3  Foray, Dominique & Arnulf Grübler (1991) Morphological Analysis, Diffusion, and Patterns of 
Technological Evolution: Ferrous Casting in France and the FRG, in Nakićenović, N. & Grübler, A. 
(eds.) Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior. Springer Verlag, page 410 that we would call technological configurations.
4 The efficiency of the system is 
measured as an average over the efficiencies of the elements it is comprised of.
5  
In a simple system where the elements are independent, the efficiency of each 
element depends only on its own state, so that the overall efficiency of the system can be 
optimized in at most N steps through making a pair wise comparison between the 
efficiencies of the states of the elements one at a time. 
In more general and realistic case the elements comprising a system are 
interdependent, so that the efficiency of each element depends on its own state and on the 
states of K other elements. The case of K=0 would then represent a system of 
independent elements, while the case of K=N-1 would represent a fully interdependent 
system, with all the other cases falling in-between the two extremes. 
 
1.2.Production Recipes and Technology Landscape 
 
From a formal point of view a system defined in this way is a graph, Γ, composed 
of two types of sets – vertices (the elements of the system) and edges (the connections 
between them), so that we have Γ = (V, E). If we want to use that structure in 
microeconomic theory, we need to make a shift from considering technology (or a firm) 
as a production function to viewing it as a production recipe.  
The word recipe itself leads to a very intuitive example explaining the importance 
of that change. It is indeed not enough to know just the list of the ingredients (elements) 
such as flour, water, salt, yeast and the temperature of the oven, together with their 
relative quantities to bake a loaf of bread. What we also need to know is how those 
ingredients are combined, in what sequence they are to be used and so on.  
This is just as true when we talk about producing a car rather than baking a loaf of 
bread, or, indeed, when we talk about designing the whole organizational and 
technological structure of a firm. 
                                                 
4 in general the number of configurations is A
N. 
5 simple average is used in the further analysis. As defined by Auerswald et al. (2000): “A production recipe is a complete list of 
engineering instructions for producing given outputs from given inputs.”
6  
The specific assignment of states to each operation a technology is comprised of is 
termed a technological configuration. The whole set of possible technological 
configurations then is a multi-dimensional technology landscape.
7 The number of 
dimensions here depends on the number of elements each configuration is comprised of, 
while the ruggedness of it is a function of how high is the level of interdependence 
between those elements. The term landscape itself is used due to the way such space 
looks like on a 3D plot. For K=0 such landscape would look like that of and around 
Mount Fuji, with a single peak representing the global (and unique) optimum. With an 
increase in K, however, the correlation between the neighboring points on the landscape 
decreases, and the landscape starts to resemble more that of Alps, with a large number of 
local peaks of different height, and valleys of different depth between them. 
Lobo and Macready (1999) provide the following definition: “A technology 
landscape  consists of (1) a profit function assigning a real-valued number to each 
technology in the space of possible technological configurations; and (2) a metric 
structure over the space of technological possibilities which reflects whether any two 
given technologies are “close” to one another or “distant” from each other.”
8 
All the technological configurations that have been employed or at least sampled 
represent the sub-set of existing technologies, while the complement sub-set represents 
the (yet) undiscovered or nascent technologies. 
 
1.3. Strategies of Innovative Change 
Generally, firms can innovate either by changing the state of one or several 
elements (operations) that constitute a part of their current technology, or alternatively, 
                                                 
6  Auerswald, Phillip; Stuart Kauffman, José Lobo & Karl Shell (2000)  The Production Recipes 
Approach to Modeling Technological Innovation: An Application to Learning by Doing, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 24, page 394 
7 Technology landscape is N+1 dimensional, with one dimension for each of the elements plus one for the 
efficiency mapping 
8 Lobo, José & William G. Macready (1999) Landscapes: A Natural Extension of Search Theory, Santa 
Fe Institute Working Paper 99-05-037 E, page1 by adding, replacing or removing any of those elements. While the latter possibility 
would be extremely interesting to explore, in line with the previous work on the subject, 
only the former option is dealt with in the current paper
9. 
Another important assumption concern the distance at which firms search for new 
technologies. We can define the distance between any two technological configurations 
on the landscape as the number of elements whose state has to be changed in order to 
convert from one to another. As Kauffman et al. (2000) write: “More precisely, the 
distance d(ωi,ωj) between the production recipes ωi and ωj is the minimum number of 
operations which must be changed in order to convert ωi to ωj.”
10  
Implicit in that statement is that distance is a symmetric measure of differences, so, 
it is as easy to convert Technology A into Technology B as the other way round. This can 
be seen as an alarming limitation of the model setting, but, in order to keep the model 
simple, and again in line with the previous work, the assumption is kept intact
11.  
More importantly for the purpose of the current paper, the notion of distance 
between the configurations enables us to distinguish between local search strategies and 
what have been termed the strategies of long jumps. The search is local if the state of only 
one element in the system is changed at a time. At any point then, a firm employing a 
particular technological configuration can move along the edges of the graph to any of 
the adjacent vertices, or else stay where it was. Making a jump would mean that two or 
more elements’ states are changed at a time, so that a firm acquires the ability to move to 
a vertice on the graph, not directly connected to the one where it was before the jump. 
There are several, both theoretical and empirical justifications of considering solely 
local search strategies. First of all, as discussed in Barney (1991), Hannan & Freeman 
(1984), Henderson & Clark (1990) and elsewhere, firms tend to innovate incrementally, 
building on their current competences. Relatedly, Levinthal & March (1981), March 
                                                 
9 There is in fact quite a lot of empirical evidence that this is quite reasonable an assumption. For a 
straightforward example think of an industry like biotechnology. See, however, Altenberg (1994), (1997) 
for a model designed to allow for such possibilities. 
10 Kauffman, Stuart; José Lobo & William G. Macready (2000) Optimal Search on a Technology 
Landscape, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 43, page 146 
11 For an extremely interesting discussion on asymmetric distances see Fontana (2003) and the references 
therein. (1991) and Teece (1986) among others show that changing the technological 
configuration drastically is associated with very high risk and uncertainty, and the 
attempts to do so have a very large probability to fail.  
Moreover, the simulation results of the model by Auerswald et al. (2000) confirm 
the intuition that: “Taking bigger steps on a given landscape is somewhat like walking 
with smaller steps on a more rugged landscape. Hence, increasing δ [the number of 
operations altered per trial] should be analogous to increasing e [number of intranalities 
per operation].”
12 
Setting Up a Model 
2.1. Search Rule: Internal (In)consistency 
Up until now we have provided a broad picture of the models of search on 
technology landscapes, discussing in sequence their foundations in more general graph 
theory, their common structure and the set of assumptions underlying that structure. Not 
much has been said however about the behavioral foundations and heuristics of search. 
While in any other respect the model below is identical to a number of other models 
of search on technology landscape, this is exactly the search rule employed where the 
modifications are made.  
In economic interpretation of the NK Model’s original setting a firm performs the 
search on the landscape through a random walk. Kauffman et al. (2000) define a search 
rule in the following simple way: “Let θi  be the efficiency of the production recipe 
currently used by the firm, and let θj be the efficiency of a newly sampled production 
recipe; if θi <θI, the firm adopts wj ∈ Ω in the next time period; if θi >θj, the firm keeps 
using wi.”
13  
Connecting this to a broader literature on search theoretic models (see Roberts and 
Weitzman 1981, Weitzman 1979 or Vishwanath 1992), search strategy put this way can 
                                                 
12  Auerswald, Phillip; Stuart Kauffman, José Lobo & Karl Shell (2000)  The Production Recipes 
Approach to Modeling Technological Innovation: An Application to Learning by Doing, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 24, page 429 
13 Kauffman, Stuart; José Lobo & William G. Macready (2000) Optimal Search on a Technology 
Landscape, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 43, page 149 be characterized as local, random and sequential, the agents employing it as possessing 
myopic perfect foresight, while the acceptance rule as overall performance based. 
Some of the non-local search strategies have been outlined above. The most 
profoundly studied non-local search strategy is the one of parallel search, where more 
than one local move is performed synchronously (see Macready et al. 1996). It has been 
found however that parallel search strategies are superior to local search only when the 
current efficiency of the system is very low, becoming increasingly disruptive for 
efficiency levels above average, especially so when the degree of parallelism is high.  
The issue of on what level should the decision on whether to accept or reject a 
possible change in configuration be made has been studied extensively (see e.g. 
Kauffman et al. 1994, Frenken et al. 1999, Dosi et al. 2001, Rivkin & Siggelkow 2003 
and Siggelkow & Levinthal 2003) based on Simon’s insight on decomposability and 
near-decomposability. Among its other merits, this setting allowed for the issue of 
organizational coordination to enter the picture, and show how different the outcome of 
search is under different levels of centralization. 
Nevertheless, probably the most crucial shortcoming of the original setting when its 
behavioral plausibility is put under test is in the internal inconsistency of treating the 
bounds on the rationality of the agents under analysis. There are two different angles to 
look at the “mental skills” of the modeled agents: 
1.  From the one hand, the agents are too limited in what they can only observe their 
current state and the consequences of their action (one at a time) for just one period 
ahead, while everything that happened before, and everything that might happen 
after, remains in complete impenetrable darkness. So the agents are bound to make 
a decision on accepting/rejecting novelty having their aspiration level defined 
exclusively by the efficiency of the technology currently in use, and the efficiency 
of the sampled adjacent technology defined exclusively by an extremely short-run 
assessment. So then, a novelty is accepted if and only if the direct immediate gain is 
positive. This story depicts an extremely boundedly rational decision making 
process. 2.  From the other hand, paradoxically, the agents are just too bright in what not only 
they are able to make a precise estimation of the efficiency of the currently used 
technology at each step of the process, but they are able, on top of it, to estimate 
with equal precision the efficiency of a technology a shift to which is under 
consideration at each such step. So they are able to know and not err a tad in 
knowing how good is something that they have never yet used. And they do not use 
the new technology before actually shifting to it in the original setting, because 
even if not stated explicitly, it is implied in the model that the evaluation and action 
stages of the process of change are disjoint and come in sequence rather than in 
parallel. Unlike the one in the previous paragraph, this story depicts an extremely 
over-rational decision making process. 
This might be the right way to represent the evolution of genes in biology
14, but the 
inherent internal inconsistency of behavioral foundations on which the model is built, 
from the perspective of man-designed technological evolution, or for that matter, of any 
evolutionary process in social domain, is extremely dangerous and implausible. We are 
simultaneously asking too much and too little from the agents in the model.  
There are two alternative ways the author has pursued in an attempt to smooth out 
the acute edges of the problem mentioned. 
An idea of off-line parallel search with insight has been recently explored (see 
Hovhannisian 2003b), showing that when parallelism is not binding, the evaluation and 
action stages of the process of change clearly distinguished and consistent with each 
other, and the assumption of absolute myopia lifted, the agents are able to reach the 
globally optimal configuration even being way short of possessing perfect foresight. In 
this way we attempt to solve the problem of inconsistency by loosening up the stringency 
of the story described in point (1) above. 
In the present treatment, consequently, the assumption underpinning the story 
described in point (2) is relaxed, so that their myopic foresight is no longer perfect. 
 
                                                 
14 although see Levitan & Kauffman (1995) for a different point of view. 2.2. Intentional and Unintentional Imprecision 
The “perfectness” part of the assumption of myopic perfect foresight has been 
challenged initially in the literature on simulated annealing (see Kirkpatrick et al. 1983) 
and noisy adaptive walks (see Levitan & Kauffman 1995). However, due to the fact that 
the former was related to the field of evolutionary programming, while the latter was a 
contribution to a debate in evolutionary biology, in neither of the two cases the 
motivation and intuition behind the change made was in any way related to the behavioral 
issues or the treatment of rationality. 
Our claim here is that modification of the assumption is absolutely necessary in the 
social domain for the reason that considering unintentional and intentional imprecision in 
evaluation of novelty is crucial both for the internal consistency of the model setting, and 
for plausibility of the results obtained. 
Unintentional imprecision is the easy part to explain. Indeed, we are hardly ever 
able to measure precisely the efficiency of the techniques and technologies in use, and far 
less so if the efficiency of novel and untried ones is attempted to be estimated. Once we 
put extreme bounds on agents’ foresight, as discussed above, both for the plausibility and 
for consistency of our argument we need to refine and narrow the bounds of their 
analytical and computational skills. It is not to say that the efficiency of a new 
technological configuration cannot be estimated at all, which would have been analogous 
to claim that each and every decision on making a technological change is taken purely at 
random. Instead we claim that while generally capable of making some approximate 
evaluation on whether change would be beneficial or not, some of the changes that would 
have been beneficial are being foregone, while some others that would later turn out to be 
detrimental are being made. 
Indeed, the fact that by far not all the decisions made by firms are precise and 
frictionless, especially when innovation-related decisions are of our concern, comes as no 
surprise to anybody, is well documented in numerous case study analyses, and makes it 
into business news headlines ever so often.  Unintentional imprecision is not always a bad thing, however. As a matter of fact, 
products of such “mistakes” include cheese, Teflon, Coca Cola, potato chips, Guinness 
beer, aspirin, penicillin, glass, electricity and even America. 
Much more interesting, however, is to make a case for intentionality of imprecision. 
The question we would try to answer below is: even assuming possible a perfectly precise 
estimation of the extremely short-run efficiency of the technological configuration a shift 
to which is contemplated on, would it be wise to follow the search rule as defined in the 
original model?  
And my guess would be: no, it would not. First of all, to see why it will not be wise 
to do so, we need to return to the issue of the rule’s internal (in)consistency.  
The overall value of any technological configuration, or indeed of any action, 
depends in general on two aspects: its current efficiency, and the possibilities for future 
actions a shift to it creates. This is close to the distinction between the of current and the 
option value. Say, standing in a long queue in front of a theater can hardly be called an 
extremely enjoyable way of spending time; however, we do stand in queues, because so 
doing provides us with an opportunity of watching a superb performance later on -- 
something that we might associate with a very high value. So, quite often, we are 
willingly decreasing the efficiency associated with our current state, in order to obtain a 
higher level of efficiency in the future.    
In the myopic setting of the model, the agents do not possess any information about 
what the future might bring, except for in a very short-run. This does not mean, however 
that they do not realize the limits of their own long-term assessment skills. Recognition 
of such limits is an important behavioral factor. As Loasby put it: “[T]he recognition of 
ignorance changes the logic of choice.”
 15 
The decision-makers realize that because the simple comparison between the 
current efficiencies of two alternative technological configurations does not contain all 
the necessary information to make a choice, rigidly following the hill-climbing policy, 
                                                 
15 Loasby, Brian (1976) Choice, Complexity and Ignorance. Cambridge University Press, page 74 they might end up being precisely wrong rather than precisely right. And as the popular 
among economists proverb goes: “it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong”. 
Rigidity is the key issue here. There is a strong evidence based on theoretical 
grounds, on the accounts of the real internal policies within firms, as well as on common 
sense, that flexibility gained through experimentation, if used within certain limits, is an 
extremely valuable asset.  
Simon writes: “Exposure to new experiences is almost certain to change the criteria 
of choice, and most human beings deliberately seek out such experience”.
16 This is a 
central topic for Loasby (1976), March (1978), Weick (1979, 1998), Stacey (1992), 
Peters (1997) and many others. Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) wrote extensively on 
organizational balancing between the rigidity trap (too much structure) and chaos trap 
(too little structure). They provide a beautiful example about how the Naskapi people of 
the North-Eastern Labrador fight for their survival in that unfriendly environment they 
live in, through caribou hunting. Many generations long experience provides them with 
good knowledge of the hunting tactics. Nevertheless, they experiment: 
Most days, the Naskapi relied on the experience of the senior 
hunters in the band. But in times of high uncertainty, when 
game had been particularly scarce, the Naskapi set aside their 
experience and turned to magic. […] So the hunter-dreamer 
cradled a shoulder blade from a long-dead caribou, attached it 
to a stick, and put it over a campfire. The band patiently waited 
for cracks to appear and then hunted in the direction of the 
cracks
17.  
That seems like a completely irrational way of decision-making. But, in reality, it 
did help them to survive, because exactly through those random trials, the Naskapi people 
could learn about the new hunting grounds, the ones that would have remained untried if 
they had persisted in following their experience all the time. 
Finally, and especially taking into consideration the above argument, decision 
makers would rationally avoid too high levels of precision in their estimates also for a 
                                                 
16 ibid., page 162 
17 ibid., page 96 simple reason that both monetary and time costs associated with further increasing it after 
some point would become unjustifiably high. 
 
2.3. Satisficing Threshold and Designing without Final Goals 
Although in quite a different vein, the idea that imperfect solutions to the problem 
can be optimally preferred to perfect ones has initially found its way into NK Model 
related literature in the work by Frenken, Marengo and Valente (Frenken et al. 1999). 
Their idea that: “if problem-solvers are ready to accept algorithms which lead to less than 
optimal (“satisficing”) solutions they can decrease the size (and thus the execution time) 
of the algorithm required to find it”
18, is relevant especially to the argument on “costs of 
precision” raised in the previous paragraph. Even more important for the current analysis 
is the definition of the set of “satisficing” solutions they give: “The set of ε-satisficing 
solution is the set of strings whose value is at most ε lower than the global optimum.”
19 
Following Frenken (2001) we would call ε a “satisficing threshold.”
 20 This idea in 
sequence bears upon the observation by Herbert Simon that: “In the face of real-world 
complexity, the business firm turns to procedures that find good enough answers to 
questions whose best answers are unknowable.”
21 
At least in its unintentional part, and to some extent on the intentional part as well, 
our vision of the issue comes very much close to the idea of satisficing threshold. 
However, there are significant differences. 
In their treatment, the threshold applies exclusively to the final level of efficiency 
obtained, while the evolutionary process leading to it leaves the search rule of the original 
model intact. It can be argued that this is exactly the way Simon was suggesting to treat 
the issue. But there are several reasons why we hold a different point of view. 
                                                 
18 Frenken, Koen, Luigi Marengo & Marco Valente (1999) Interdependencies, Near-Decomposability 
and Adaptation. In: Brenner, T. (ed.) Computational Techniques for Modeling Learning in Economics. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, page 147 
19ibid., page 157 
20 Frenken, Koen (2001) Understanding Product Innovation using Complex Systems Theory. Unpublished 
Academic Thesis. University of Amsterdam, page 76 
21 Simon, Herbert (1969 [1996]) The Sciences of the Artificial. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, page 28  First of all Simon to a large extent dealt with situations when many alternatives 
exist, some fraction of them can be sampled, but only one has to be chosen, and when it 
is, the search stops. So the question was mainly about how large a fraction to sample, 
before making the final choice. On the contrary, in the NK setting, we model agents who 
have to make a choice each period, and regardless of whether the new alternative has 
been accepted or not, the process continues on, and in the next period another choice 
situation is faced. So, unlike the former case when there is a single goal, to which an 
assumption of satisficing threshold can be applied, we have here the case of evolution to 
(generally unreachable) final goal through accepting or rejecting subgoals in the process.  
Simon himself was quite skeptical about considering any goal final. He writes: 
“The idea of final goals is inconsistent with our limited ability to foretell or determine the 
future. The real result of our actions is to establish initial conditions for the next 
succeeding stage of action”
22, and also: “A paradoxical, but perhaps realistic, view of 
design goals is that their function is to motivate activity which in turn will generate new 
goals.”
23 
Organizational and technological design is indeed an open-end process, and if so, 
there seems to be no reason, or even a possibility, to view some steps in this process as 
leading to more final goals than others. Therefore it seems to be quite natural in the world 
of “designing without final goals”
24, to augment the idea of accepting good-enough end 
results with a mechanism of taking good-enough decisions in each step of organizational 
and technological design process. 
There is actually, one final reason, why such a change calls for being made. It is 
quite strange indeed to consider a rule that says: continue search until a solution that is at 
most ε worse than the globally optimal one is found, for a simple reason that this would 
suggest that we actually know the exact value of such global optimum. And, quite 
naturally, we never really do. 
 
                                                 
22 ibid., page 163 
23 ibid., page 162 
24 originally a title of a paragraph in Simon’s book. ibid., page 162 2.4. Memory Dependence: When We Was Fab vs. No Regrets 
“Back then long time ago when grass was green          “No regrets, they don’t work 
Woke up in a daze, Arrived like strangers in the night        No regrets they only hurt…” 
Fab - long time ago when we was fab…” 
 
George  Harrison         Robbie  Williams 
 
  In the previous two sections we dealt predominantly with the question of how the 
uncertain future returns would influence out current choices. Future consequences of 
today’s choice, however, are not its sole determinants. Let us now look at the other side 
of the coin, and see how past choices, successes and failures can hinder or influence what 
we are willing, and indeed capable to do today. 
Despite the fact that imperfectness of local search dispels the nearly path-
determined nature of the search process, through endowing the agents with a chance to 
deviate (be it unintentionally or intentionally) from the originally chosen path, past still 
plays a significant role in evaluating today’s choices. 
In fact, it has in this setting a much higher explanatory power than before. In the 
original model’s strictly uphill walk scenario, every new technology a shift to which is 
being made is the most efficient one that has ever been employed by the firm throughout 
its history. This is pretty obvious, since if it wasn’t, a shift to it simply wouldn’t have 
been made. In this simplified representation of realty the efficiencies of the technologies 
used in the past don’t really influence the current aspiration levels by default. 
In the modified version of the model presented here, downhill moves are possible, 
so that the efficiency of the technology currently in use does not necessarily have to be 
the highest of what has been encountered before. Due to the fact that a firm is not 
anymore assumed to be able to estimate the efficiency of an untried technology with 
precision, it might overestimate it, and realize the mistake only when the shift to an 
inferior technological configuration has already been made.  
What if this does happen? Should the firm set as its aspiration level the efficiency 
of the currently used inferior technology, and try to get away from it to a better one as 
fast as they can? Should it alternatively, keep the past, more efficient technology as the 
benchmark with which the possible novel technologies are to be compared with, cashing in on the knowledge of the existence of more favorable point in the landscape they 
possess? Should it finally base their decisions on the combination of the two? 
The third option is probably the most interesting to consider, and is the optimal 
choice of action from a decision-maker’s perspective, since balancing between the two 
extremes would have provided a firm with an ability to capitalize on the past, without at 
the same time being too rigid in treating novelty. However, the case of exploring that 
option brings the whole complex dynamics of aspiration level adjustments into the 
picture, and deserves a separate treatment (see Hovhannisian 2003c). 
For the purposes of the current analysis, we would explore instead the extreme 
cases of “memory dependence” that we term after two songs, cited in the beginning of the 
section.  
Agents in When We Was Fab setting are fully memory dependent. Once they have 
made a mistake that brought them to a substantially inferior technology, they will try to 
review their choice and get back to a better technological neighborhood. However, this 
would also mean that no matter how low on the technology landscape they have found 
themselves due to a misjudged shift to an inferior technology, they will stick to it until 
they find a technological configuration that according to their estimations is more 
efficient than the maximally efficient previously encountered one. Hence they would not 
agree to shift to any novel technology even a fraction worse than the one they have 
experienced using in their times when they was fab. And the efficiency of this latter 
technology would serve as their aspiration level. 
On the contrary, the agents in No Regrets setting are careless about their past 
successes and failures, deeming the only pair of efficiencies important in making a 
decision on accepting/rejecting novelty the one currently in use and the one currently 
under scrutiny. So, even if because of a miscalculation of new technology’s efficiency 
they actually made a downhill move, they will not regret the good times, but rather 
would do everything to find an improvement over the currently used, inefficient 
technology. So then, their aspiration level is always kept equal to the their current 
operational efficiency. Both alternatives, even if simplifying it quite substantially, reflect the reality of 
decision-making, and have been analyzed in various settings in March & Olsen (1976), 
Weick (1976), Harrison & March (1984), Nystrom & Starbuck (1984) and Miller (1994). 
The first alternative, even if more rigid, provides more certainty. While letting the 
agents explore and experiment in the vicinity of the currently chosen path, this setting 
precludes them from wandering too far away, thus in a way keeping the balance between 
exploration and exploitation. Second alternative is more dangerous in what a series of 
even slight miscalculations can lead to a very significant fall in performance of the firm 
on aggregate. However, the more reckless and novelty seeking behavior can allow the 
agents to spot far better peaks on the landscape.  
 
Simulation Model 
3.1. Simulation Toolkit  
All the simulations below were run using Laboratory for Simulation Development 
(Lsd) language, developed by Marco Valente. Lsd is a freeware that can be downloaded 
from http://www.business.auc.dk/~mv/Lsd/lsd.html. This simulation language is built on 
C++ platform, and thus is characterized by the speed and flexibility of a low-level 
language. However, the layer of interfaces embedded in its structure make it much more 
user-friendly than the former, and possible to use by non-programmers. 
NK Model in the original setting is included in the Lsd package as one of the 
example models. The code for the modified version of it, used in the subsequent analysis 
in the present paper is available on demand from the author. 
 
3.2. Modeling “Imperfect” Local Search Strategies 
We suggest here that the search rule of the original NK model can be easily 
reformulated for the purpose of modeling “imperfect” local search strategies. As it was 
noted before, in the original model, the new configuration wj is adopted instead of the 
current one wi if and only if θj  >θi, where  θj  is the efficiency of a newly sampled production recipe, and θi is the efficiency of the production recipe currently used by the 
firm. It has also been noted that because of the particular way in which the original model 
was set up, at each period the currently used technology wi is always the most efficient 
one ever tried, so that  
θi, t=θmax, t for ∀t.                                                    (1) 
Let us instead consider that the firm can observe perfectly only the efficiency of the 
currently employed technological configuration, θi, while observing some hypothetical 
level of efficiency θ j instead of the real value θj, with: 
θ  j = θj +χε            ( 2 )    
where  ε is randomly distributed in [-0.5;0.5], and χ is a tunable parameter 
measuring the degree of imprecision (either intentional or unintentional) of the agent’s 
estimation of the new configuration’s potential efficiency level. The extreme case of χ=0 
reflects a perfectly myopically rational strategy of the agents as in the original model, 
while, on the opposite, a case of χ=1 reflects a situation when the observed efficiency of 
a new configuration is maximally random.  
Due to the possibility of shifting to an inferior technological configuration present 
in the current model modification, equation (1) does not hold with certainty anymore, so 
that we can differentiate between the rules of accepting/rejecting novel technologies 
between the agents in When We Was Fab and No Regrets settings. 
The agents using the former strategy would adopt a new configuration if and only 
if θmax <  θ j, while the ones using the latter, would do so if and only if θi  < θ j. 
The mean value of ε is 0, so that on average firms in both settings observe the real 
value of each possible configuration, and are not biased as for the “direction” of 
imprecision. However, given that θ  ∈ [0,1], and given the randomness of ε, the 
modification of the model would lead to cases when for the values of χ≠0 and increasing 
towards χ=1, the agent is more and more likely to either reject a configuration that is 
more efficient than the current one, and, more importantly, to accept configurations moving it “downhill”. It is assumed that once the new configuration is accepted, its true 
efficiency level becomes perfectly observable for the firm.   
Due to a restriction that the efficiency cannot be negative or have a value of more 
than the maximum of 1, the algorithm of the model on which the simulations are run is 
written in such a way to assign a value of 0 for all the values of θ  j< 0, and a value of 1 
for all θ  j> 1. 
 
2.4. Simulation Results 
For all the simulation runs the value of N was kept constant equal to 20, while the 
value of K ∈ {0, … , N-1}. The value of χ varies for each K in the range {0, … , 0,5}, with 
an interval of 0.025 to account thus for the probability of making a mistake in evaluation 
of the efficiency of the new configuration in the range between 0% and 50% in each 
direction.
25 For each value of K the simulation was run 10 times, with different seeds. 
The efficiency of each strategy was computed as the average over the efficiency obtained 
by each of the 10 agents employing it. Hence for each combination of K and χ, 100 
observations were obtained. Due to physical limitations, the never-ending process of 
technological and organizational change was “stopped” at 5000
th step. 
The first thing that we want to see is whether our intuition about the imprecision in 
myopic search being a virtue and not only a threat is backed up by the results of the 
simulation runs. Figures 1 and  2 provide the averaged results for all the possible 
combinations of parameters K and χ in the When We Was Fab and No Regrets settings 
respectively.  
<Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here> 
The figures present on a 3-D plot the average efficiency levels obtained by the 
agents for each pair of K and χ at the last, 5000
th  step, as well as its 2-D top projection. 
                                                 
25 Larger values of χ were not taken into consideration for the reason of their being clearly inferior for each 
K. The first striking result of the modified model is that for no values of K, apart 
from the uninteresting case of K=0, is the perfectly precise rigid behavior (corresponding 
to the case of χ=0) optimal. 
As it can be seen from the figures, only for the cases of low complexity, 
corresponding to low values of K, the optimal level of χ is just marginally higher than 
0%. With increasing K, the optimal levels of χ reach for the both settings a level of 10% 
already for K=3, slowly and steadily rising from 12,5% to 22,5%  for more complex 
systems. The optimal values of χ show quite similar dynamics between the two settings, 
with the values for the No Regrets setting just slightly lower for the corresponding values 
of K.  
In  Figures 3 and 4 , we analyze instead the efficiency obtained by the agents 
averaged over 5000 time steps for all the combinations of K and χ. 
<Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here> 
This is done in order to control for the possible change in dynamics when the whole 
evolution of the efficiency levels is taken into consideration rather than only the position 
of the agents on the technology landscape at some particular time step. The results 
confirm that the story behind the Figures 1 and 2 is just as valid in this case. 
However, as a prescriptive tool just telling the optimal level of imprecision is not 
enough. As has been discussed in length above, the level of imprecision is both a result of 
intentional strategic action by the agents and unintentional consequence stemming from 
the bounds on their abilities to evaluate the novelty. Hence, the actual value of χ can only 
be partially controlled by a firm. In this circumstances, we would be interested to see how 
large is the range of imprecision levels that lead to attainment of higher efficiency points 
on the landscape than it would have been in the case of employing a χ=0 rigid strategy.  
The results differ substantially for the two settings analyzed. In the When We Was 
Fab scenario, the deviations from the strict uphill walk are controlled to a higher extent 
than for the case of non-regretting agents. Hence even having a level of imprecision level 
substantially higher than the optimal, the results obtained are still preferred to the rigid 
case. Indeed the highest level of imprecision still superior to the case of  χ=0 case reaches 25-30% already for the K as low as 3, and stays at about 40% for average-to-high 
levels of complexity. Taking the terminal efficiency level at step 5000 instead of the 
average reinforces the observed dynamics. 
Alternatively, in the No Regrets setting, values of χ too high are too risky, because 
the lack of control for the recurrence of mistake-making means that the agents can drift 
too far downhill, and never be able to recover from the loss of efficiency. So, the intuition 
that this setting is more dangerous is being confirmed just as well.  
Nevertheless, the dangers of this setting are being paid off by the fact that for all the 
levels of complexity, the technological efficiency corresponding to the optimal 
imprecision level is always higher than for the case of less flexible memory dependent  
case of the  When We Were Fab way of strategizing. 
So, just as was intuitively stated in the above section, there is a trade-off between 
the relatively higher certainty of memory dependent way of action, and the relatively 
higher flexibility the non regretting strategy provides for. So, once the firms are sure 
enough they can tune the imprecision to the optimal level, the more risky strategy can be 
applied in order to gain higher returns, but once the imprecision is more of an 
unintentional outcome of bounds on rationality, and cannot be perfectly controlled for, 
the relatively more rigid When We Was Fab strategy is preferred. The results are 
presented graphically in Figure 5 for some values of K. 
<Insert Figure 5 about here> 
The number of local peaks rises with the complexity of the technology landscape, 
and as can also be observed from that figure, the higher is K the larger is the range of χ 
for which the No Regrets setting is the winning choice. This is quite an obvious result, 
since, the larger amount of local peaks leads to a higher chance of getting caught-up on a 
sub-optimal one. But then, the more is that danger, the more valuable becomes the 
flexibility that results from the higher frequency and boldness of experimentation the 
setting is characterized with. 
Finally, an interesting perspective opens up when we look at Figure 6. What the 
figure shows is the comparison of the performance of the agents employing the search heuristic of the original model (χ=0), and for the both settings, the “super agents” that are 
able to tune their parameter χ to each of the levels of complexity, given by the parameter 
K, so that to attain the optimal fitness in each of those cases (χ optimal). 
<Insert Figure 6 about here> 
What is interesting here is not only that the figure confirms the previous results; this 
had to be the case for obvious reasons. The interesting observation can be made 
comparing the behavior of from the one hand the line representing the χ=0 case, and, 
from the other, the lines representing the remaining two cases.  
As in the original Kauffman’s model, after a very short initial increase in the 
average fitness, with the growing complexity of the system, its value steadily declines. 
This result was taken to suggest that the agents have to work on decreasing the 
complexity of the system through different mechanisms in order to hope for a better 
overall performance. 
Now, this is not at all necessarily the case if we take the value of χ positive. For 
both of the remaining two cases in the graph, the initial growth is much longer and much 
steeper. Reaching its maximum at K=4, the average efficiency remains pretty high for the 
values of K up to K=7 (and arguably even longer so for the No Regrets case), and does 
not go below the case of K=0 for no values of K, however large it is. On the other hand, 
for the case of χ=0 for all the values of K>8, we observe the average fitness lower than 
that the agent attains in the completely unconnected system, that a K=0 case represents.  
This is important in two ways. First of all, the mechanism that the agents can design 
in order to decrease the complexity of the system are costly, and hence ceteris paribus are 
not desirable.
26 Now, using a scheme with a positive value of χ, apart from the other 
pluses, discussed above, thus, lowers that cost just as well. Secondly, the so-called new 
economy calls for an increased emphasis that has to be put on the cases of average and 
high complexity, exactly where the search heuristics employing positive values of the 
parameter χ are performing especially good compared to the case of the original setting 
of the model. 
                                                 
26 for more detailed discussion on dangers of modular design see Hovhannisian (2003b) Generalizations and Discussion 
There are several points of possible concern that can be raised regarding the above 
model modifications, and in this section I would try to discuss some of them. 
First of all, one might ask, what actually does the trick? In the modified version of 
the new configuration adopting rule, the factor of randomness seems to play a major part. 
The mechanism seems to be very reminiscent of the simulated annealing principle, well 
known in the literature on genetic programming
27.  
In fact, some of the literature on business case studies that served as the starting 
point for the current paper indeed give a lot of attention to randomness as the surprising 
force helping to run the business better. Such is the example in Brown & Eisenhardt cited 
above.  
However, my belief, and my aim in this paper was not to accentuate the role of 
randomness in decision making. The main point was to see how true indeed is the 
proposition of Simon on deliberate experimentation as the guiding force in decision 
making when facing a complex changing world where no goal is ultimately final.  
To check whether random variable actually does play a role, a slight modification 
of the model was developed, in which randomness was absent. It was noticed that while 
in the model modification presented above the errors in precise estimation of the relative 
efficiency of the novel technological configurations could have been both in the sense of 
accepting a configuration that in fact was inferior to the currently employed one, or 
rejecting the ones in fact superior to it, the whole idea of experimentation as the guiding 
force suggests putting more emphasis towards the so to say “optimistic” errors.  
Rejecting what might have been a better way of running the business just does not 
seem to be a good an idea intuitively. So then, would it be right to say that this is exactly 
the acquired option of accepting modifications even if they are slightly inferior to the 
present state of affairs that makes the difference? 
The results of the simulation runs show that this is indeed the case. What was 
changed is again the mechanism of accepting or rejecting new adjacent configurations. 
                                                 
27 I would like to thank Koen Frenken for bringing my attention to this point. Instead of the one used above, the following rule was suggested: accept a new 
configuration wj instead of the currently employed configuration wi if and only if θi <θ j, 
where
28: 
θ  j = θj +χ/ 2       ( 8 )  
 
The results are extremely similar to the ones discussed above both in terms of the 
optimal level of χ, and the highest levels of it still superior to the case of χ=0.  
This suggests that this is not the randomization of the strategy, and neither the fact 
of mistake-making per se that is responsible for the results discussed above, but indeed it 
is the case that overly rigid structures of the perfect myopic optimization technique just 
do not let the decision maker gain from the advantages a more flexible scheme of a 
dynamic, experimenting decision making provides. 
Another concern might be raised in this respect. It could be the case that omission 
of such factor as the search costs can benefit overly explorative activities, while a 
modification of the model to a one that accounts for those costs would also allow a 
conservative strategy of accepting only the configurations by some fraction superior to 
the current one becoming a winning one. 
This is a more difficult concern to answer to, because of the difficulties of directly 
measuring such costs in the present algorithm of the model. Nevertheless, some 
conjectures can still be made in this respect. First of all, it has to be noted that search 
costs can be classified in two major groups:  
  The shifting costs between the two adjacent technological or organizational 
configurations 
  The costs of actually estimating whether such change is desirable. 
Now, with no doubts, the search heuristic applied in the present modification of the 
model calls for an increase in the first group of the costs. Experimenting means more 
                                                 
28 χ/2 is taken instead of χ to account for the same magnitude of the effect when we change from a 
stochastic to a deterministic case. often changes, and hence more resources have to be directed towards shifting costs. The 
magnitude of that increase can be measured in the simulation runs by the successful 
mutations parameter. And it does increase substantially when we move from the case of 
χ=0 to positive values of χ.  
Thus, depending on K, for its high enough values, the search heuristic 
corresponding to the optimal values of χ presupposes about 10-30 times more shifts than 
in the case of χ=0 for the No Regrets, and about 5-10 times more for the When We Was 
Fab setting, and hence, the overall shift costs should be significantly higher. 
 However, this is not as alarming as it might seem. The thing is that for high enough 
values of K, the optimal value of χ is between 15-25% in both directions, which accounts 
for the double of that values range of desired imprecision. But then, as it has been noted 
above, that imprecision is a way of economizing on the costs of evaluating the relative 
efficiency of the yet untried adjacent technologies.  
Thus, while dragging the shifting costs up, such search heuristic lowers 
significantly the calculation and estimation costs. Measuring the relative magnitude of 
these two effects unfortunately is an unsolved problem yet, but the fact that we are 
considering here the day-by-day small organizational and technological shifts, which are 
not great in magnitude, leaves us to think that the costs associated with such shifts should 
not be too high, and should well be balanced by the decrease in the presumed precision in 
estimating the yet unknown.    
Consequently, one might ask, why do the agents necessarily have to stick to some 
given magnitude of imprecision, rather than trying to tune that parameter in accordance 
with the level of the complexity of the system?  
Indeed, as it has been noted in the discussion of the Figure 6 above, the “super 
agents” able to do so apparently perform better than the agents applying any other given 
search scheme. So, in a way the model restricts the possibilities of the agents. Quite 
obviously, a simpler system calls for more rigid scheme, because of the tradeoff between 
the costs of rigidity (low in this case) and the possibility it gives to reach a higher level of efficiency, and that scheme has to become more and more flexible with an increase in the 
complexity. 
Moreover, the possibility of tuning the parameter χ is an important advantage in 
other, probably even more important respect. With the evolution of technology, different 
and quite distinct phases change each other. Apparently then, different values of χ would 
be optimal depending on whether the agents are in the phase of fast and booming 
development of the given technology, or the technology is mature, and only slight and 
slow changes are being made to it. 
Finally, a concern might be raised regarding the question of why don’t the agents 
change the state of several elements at the same time. One of the reasons of not including 
that possibility in the model is that what I was focusing the attention on are the small day-
by-day decisions, and especially since the agents are given possibility to deviate from the 
rigid rule of accepting new technological configurations proposed in earlier papers on the 
subject, a change in the state of more than one element at a time was not seen important. 
From the other hand, Auerswald et al. (2000) confirm the intuition that an effect “taking 
bigger steps on a given landscape” has is “like walking with smaller steps on a more 
rugged landscape.”
29 So then, because we consider here the landscapes of all the possible 
levels of ruggedness, introducing a possibility of taking larger steps would just mean 
doing a double work, without expecting any new results. 
Turning from forward-looking  to the question of memory dependence, it is obvious 
to claim that the two cases discussed are not fully representative of how the past is 
weighed in real-life business practice. However, the aim of this paper was not in 




                                                 
29  Auerswald, Phillip; Stuart Kauffman, José Lobo & Karl Shell (2000)  The Production Recipes 
Approach to Modeling Technological Innovation: An Application to Learning by Doing, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 24, page 427 
 The current paper has dealt with broadly two related issues in innovation-related 
business strategizing.  
First we discussed in much detail the question of how the uncertain future returns 
influence our current choices. From the one hand, the internal inconsistency of endowing 
the agents with too much and too little sense-making abilities, present in the original 
model has been criticized. It has been noted that the assumption of firm’s inherent ability 
to precisely estimate the efficiency of a novel technology without bearing the 
consequences of actually having shifted to it, is quite questionable. In this way the 
unintentionality of imprecision entered the picture.  
It was noted further that imprecision is not only a consequence of limits on human 
analytical skills, but a remedy from the rigidity of not realizing our own ignorance. Our 
claim was that once the limits to our foresight precludes the possibility to see such long-
run consequences, firms might be well better off deviating from the strict rule-following 
behavior of accepting only uphill leading modifications of the technology in use. This 
statement goes in line with Weick’s claim that: “Loosely coupled systems may be elegant 
solutions to the problem that adaptation can preclude adaptability.”
30  
In a newspaper article I read a while ago it was discussed how people turn back 
from the high-precision all-autonomous housing plans, to the more conventional ones. 
The reason was in that the hi-tech insulation of the walls and windows led to very 
substantial increase of allergies the owners of those houses acquired. Now this is exactly 
the same with overly-rigid search schemes, where the imposed precision of the rule being 
followed leads to the case where the tiny “viruses” that once were introduced (even if not 
intentionally) in the scheme, are not given a chance of leaving the system ever after, and 
ultimately result in its failure or stagnation. 
The analysis of virtues of intentional imprecision has been present in Simon’s and 
March’s works on deliberate experimentation and throughout Weick’s, Loasby’s and 
Stacey’s books and articles. On a more “applied” level, Nystrom and Starbuck (1984) 
observed that: “Experimentation offers many benefits as a central frame of reference for 
                                                 
30 Weick, Karl E. (1976) Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, March, vol. 21, page 7 top managers. People who see themselves as experimenting are willing to deviate 
temporarily from practices they consider optimal in order to test the validity of their 
assumption”
31 
Again based on Simon-March-Olsen line of work on “designing without final 
goals”, a necessity to adjust the idea of Frenken and colleagues on “satisficing threshold” 
has been proposed. It was argued that technological evolution is an open-end process and 
a shift from applying the satisficing rule to the end results to applying it to every single 
step of technological evolution can be necessary. 
The second key task raised in the current paper was to attempt to answer how much 
indeed do the firms have to be dependant on their own past experience, especially so, 
their past successes. Guided by empirical observations such as: “Organizations succumb 
to crises largely because their top managers, bolstered by recollections of past successes, 
live in world circumscribed by their cognitive structures”
32, as well as by insights gained 
from the work on “core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton 2000) and “perils of excellence” 
(Miller 1994) it was proposed to analyze memory dependence in two extreme settings. 
 One of them, termed When We Was Fab strategy, puts too much weight on the past 
successes, and disregards the possible current dire straits. The other, termed a strategy of 
No Regrets, on the opposite, treats the memory “as a pest”, as suggested by Weick 
(1976), and considers the only relevant data for making a choice the efficiency of the 
technology currently in use, and the efficiency of the technology a shift to which is 
possible. While the former brings more certainty into the structure, the latter gains on 
increased flexibility. 
All the above intuitive considerations were put under test in simulation setting, 
using as a benchmark case Kauffman’s NK Model that has attracted recently much 
interest in evolutionary modeling. In our view while having an extremely high potential 
for economic applications this model suffers from the side-effects of direct translation of 
biological concepts into the filed of social evolution.  
                                                 
31  Nystrom, Paul C. & William H. Starbuck (1984) To Avoid Organizational Crises, Unlearn, 
Organizational Dynamics, Spring 1984, page 62 
32 ibid, page 57-58 The main point of the current analysis thus has been to provide behavioral 
background nested to a larger degree in economic theory and business literature. As the 
analysis in the current paper has shown, when some of the behavioral assumptions are 
tuned to the case of human-influenced (if not to say human-determined) technological 
evolution, a number of conclusions valid for the natural systems fail to hold, or else 
become locally valid, while the others grow in importance.  
In the end, remembering once again Simon’s idea on design without final goals, we 
would like to note that the model discussed in the current paper is by far not meant to be 
considered such a final goal. On the contrary, our belief is that NK-inspired research is 
able to give much more important and general results if we note that probably the greatest 
advantage it provides us with is in the fact that here, unlike either the mainstream 
neoclassical theory, where too much stress is put on rationality and intentionality, or the 
“mainstream” evolutionary economics, where the agents too often are seen as possessing 
no rationality or insight at all, and the purportive strategizing is substituted to a high 
degree with the idea of them adapting blindly to external environmental changes, here we 
are able to bring comparisons between agents employing different (and changing) 
strategies, and putting them in different environments, get the idea on how much valuable 
one or the other is in different circumstances.  References: 
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